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Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494) is without
doubt one of the most intriguing figures of the Italian Renaissance. It is
thus no surprise that he has attracted the attention of many modern
scholars. By reason of the varied interests that are reflected in his
writings, contrasting interpretations of Pico have been proposed.1 Our
purpose here is not to present a new and different picture of Pico but,
rather, to offer a contribution to one fruitful area of research pursued
by some recent historians of philosophy, namely, Pico's debt to, and
1. For general presentations of Pico's life and thought, see the classic study
of Eugenio Garin, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: Vita e dottirina (Florence: F. Le
Monnier, 1937); Garin's magisterial Storia della filosofia italiana, 2d ed. (Turin: G.
Einaudi 1966), 1:458-495. Among more recent general accounts are Pierre-Marie
Cordier, Jean Pic de la Mirandole (Paris: Debresse, 1958); Engelbert Monnerjahn,
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1960); Paul Oskar Kristeller,
Eight Philosophers of the Italian Renaissance (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964),
pp. 54-71; Giovanni di Napoli, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola e laproblemaύca dottrinale
del suo tempo (Rome: Desclee, 1965); Charles Trinkaus, In Our Image and Likeness
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 2:505-526; and Henri de Lubac, Pic
de la Mirandole: Etudes et discussions (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1974).
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use of, medieval philosophy in his overall philosophical enterprise.2
Of particular concern will be the influence of Albert the Great on
Pico, which can be established by a connection that has apparently
not been noticed by Pico's historians. A rather unusual interpretation
that Pico offered of Plato's notion of the soul will be shown to have
already been set forth by Albert the Great, one of Pico's favorite
medieval sources.3 It will be argued that Pico drew this interpretation
from Albert, possibly having forgotten its source. The plausibility of
this thesis obviously rests in part on the ground of Pico's general
interest in Albert.^ This use of Albert by Pico is but further evidence
of a tradition of "Albertism" to be found in Italy during the late
Middle Ages and the Renaissance.5
2. See in particular the pioneering study of Avery Dulles, Pήnceps Concordiae
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1941), and also the more recent study
of Paul Oskar Kristeller, "Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and His Sources," in Uopera
e il pensiero di Giovanni Pico della Mirandola nella storia dell'urnanesimo (Florence: 1st.
naz. di studi sul Rinascimento, 1965), 1:35-133. See also Innocenzo Colosio, "Pico
della Mirandola e la scolastica," in Studi Pichiani (Modena, 1965), pp. 41-57.
3. Albert is listed by Pico in his celebrated Oration on the Dignity of Man among the
medieval Christians who engaged in philosophy. The others mentioned are Thomas
Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent, and Francis Meyronnes.
Albert is distinguished in that his works contain something that is "ancient, copious,
and great" (pήscum, amplum et grande). See De hominis dignitate, Heptaplus, De ente et
uno, ed. Eugenio Garin, (Florence: Vallecchi, 1942), p. 140. It should also be noted
that Albert is placed first among the Latins represented in Pico's Conclusiones sive
theses DCCCC, ed. Bohdan Kieszkowski (Geneva: Droz, 1973), pp. 27-28.
4. This interest is indicated by the works of Albert that were found in Pico's
library: see Pearl Kibre, The Library of Pico della Mirandola (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1936), pp. 61-62, 70, and 113. Albert's commentaries on Aristotle
and other works like the De homine appear in the inventory published by Kibre (pp.
119-297). Especially significant is the presence of Albert's Metaphysica (pp. 147-148,
entry no. 196).
5. For discussions regarding Albert's influence in Italy in the late Middle Ages and
the Renaissance, see Martin Grabmann, Mittelalterliches Geistesleben 2 (Munich: Max
Huber, 1936), pp. 396-400 and 407-408; Edward P. Mahoney, "Albert the Great and
the Studio Patavino in the Late Fifteenth and Early Sixteenth Centuries," in Albertus
Magnus and the Sciences, ed. James A. Weisheipl (Toronto: PIMS, 1980), pp. 537—
563; Graziella Federici Vescovini, "Su alcune testimonialize dell'influenza di Alberto
Magno come 'metaphysico', scienziato e 'astrologo' nella filosofia padovana del cadere
del secolo XV: Angelo di Fossombrone e Biagio Pelacani da Parma," in Albert der
Grosse: Seine Zeit, sein Werk, seine Wirkung, ed. Albert Zimmermann, Miscellanea
Mediaevalia 14 (Berlin and New York: W. de Gruyter, 1981), pp. 155-176; Gregorio
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In his commentary on Calo ben Calonymus's fourteenth-century
Latin translation of Averroes's Tahafut aUTahafut, known as the De-
structio destructionump Agostino Nifo (c. 1470—1538)7 sketches out
three basic positions on the soul, namely, (a) the position that was at-
tributed to Plato by Giovanni Pico della Mirandola in a conversation
that he had with Nifo, (b) the position of Aristotle and Averroes, and
(c) the position that is held by Christian faith and that Nifo believes
to be Plato's real position.
The first two positions (α and b) maintain that the soul is one in
number for all humans both before its entry into the human body
and also after it departs from the body, but it is multiplied while it
is in the body. These two positions differ inasmuch as position α,
attributed to Plato, states that a real multiplication of souls is brought
about (multiplicatio fiat secundum rem) as long as the soul is in the
body, whereas position b, of Aristotle and Averroes, maintains that
the single intellect is "multiplied" according to the many relation-
ships (secundum respectus et habitudines multas) which exist only in
human bodies and not in the single intellect itself. That is to say,
there is no real multiplication of the separate intellect or intellective
soul for Aristotle and Averroes. Nifo makes clear that however one
understands position b, it is false and not to be believed.
Position έ>, that is, that of Aristotle and Averroes as he under-
stands them, Nifo rejects. But he does not do so on the basis of
Piaia, "La genese de Γinterpretation historique et philosophique d'Albert le Grand
(XVe-XVIΠe siecles)," in Albert der Grosse, ed. Zimmermann, pp. 237-255; Luigi
Olivieri, Pietro d'Abano e il penskro neolatino (Padua: Antenore, 1988).
6. On this translation and Nifo's edition, see Moritz Steinschneider, Die hebrάischen
Ubersetzungen des Mittekdters und die Jϋden als Dolmetscher (Berlin: Bibliographische
Bureau, 1893), pp. 330-333; Maurice Bouyges, ed., Averroes: Tahafot aUTahafot,
Bibliotheca Arabica Scholasticorum, serie arabe 3 (Beirut: ίmprimerie Catholique,
1930), pp. xxiii-xxvi. The work was translated again in the sixteenth century by
another Calo Calonymos, namely, Calonymos ben David of Naples. See Beatrice
A. Zedler, ed., Averroes' "Destructio Destructionum Phibsophiae Algazelis" in the Latin
Version of Cab Cabnymos (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1961), pp. 24-31.
7. On Nifo's life and works, see Edward P. Mahoney, "Agostino Nifo," Dictionary of
Scientific Biography 10:122-124; Pietro Borraro, "Agostino Nifo, umanista e filosofo,"
Archivio storico di teπa di lavoro 5 (1977): 169-192. For his years at Padua, see Bruno
Nardi, Saggi suWaristotelismo padovano dal secob XIV al XVI (Florence: Olschki, 1958);
Edward P. Mahoney, "A Note on Agostino Nifo," Phibbgical Quarterly 50 (1971):
125-132.
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any philosophical refutation, for at this point in his philosophical
development he believed that reason was incapable of finding such a
refutation. Instead he invokes the authority of the "Christian law"
(lex nostra), that is, the doctrinal teaching of the church, which
maintains that human souls remain after death as individual souls—
those souls which did good are glorified while some are damned,
namely, those which sinned. Nifo adds that he thinks that this view,
namely, that individual souls survive death, is also the opinion of
Plato and Avicebron. Nonetheless, Nifo is careful to add that the
famed opinion of Plato can still be explained according to the first
interpretation (α). Indeed Nifo reveals that one of his contemporaries
believed that the first position (a) was Plato's own mind.8
Earlier in his commentary Nifo had in fact indicated that in a
conversation with him Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (comes Mίrαn-
dulus) had attributed just such a theory to Plato. The conversation
apparently took place in late May 1494, while the two young philoso-
phers were traveling from Ferrara, where the young Thomas de Vio
(1468-1534), later to become Cardinal Cajetan,9 had given a public
8. Agostino Nifo Expositio, in Destructiones destructionum Averroys cum Augμstini
Niphi de Suessa expositione 4 doubt 7 (Venice, 1497), fol. 65ra: "Debes scire quod ilia
prima opinio de anima, dicens quod anima est una ante adventurn ad corpus et post,
et dum est in corpore multiplicatur, potest intelligi duobus modis. Uno modo quod
ista multiplicatio fiat secundum rem ipsi animae ita quod ipsa anima dum corpori
unitur est multa secundum rem, dum separatur uniatur secundum rem et ίΐant omnes
una. Et haec videtur opinio attribuita Platoni, ut fuit visum in prima disputatione.
Alio modo potest intelligi quod anima prout est intellectus est unus numero, prout
intelligitur in corpore efficitur multa secundum respectus et habitudines multas, non
quidem respectibus et habitudinibus inhaerentibus ipsi intellectui, sed corporibus in
quibus unitur. Et haec est opinio Aristotelis et Averrois ut recitatum fuit in prima
disputatione in solutione 23. Sed quomodocumque intelligitur est falsa et non est
credibilis. Immo lex nostra ponit quod animae mortuorum remanent post et quaedam
in gloria, ut illae quae fecerunt bene, aliquae damnatae, ut illae quae peccaverunt. Et
haec est opinio Avicebronis et Platonis, ut puto. Potest tamen ilia opinio famosa
secundum primum intellectum adhuc exponi, quoniam unus vir coetaneus meus
volebat illam esse mentem Platonis." This volume formed a unit with Nifo's edition of
Aristotle and Averroes published in 1495-1496. See Gesamtkatabg der Wiegendrίlcken
2 (Leipzig: Hiersemann, 1926), no. 2340, cols. 572-574; 3 (1928), no. 3106, cols.
216-217.
9. Cajetan's years at Padua remain to be studied in greater depth. On his life and
works, see M.-J. Congar, "Bio-bibliographie de Cajetan," Revue thomiste 39 (1934-
1935): 3-49.
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disputation at the general chapter of the Dominicans, in the direction
of Bologna, where they were to attend the general chapter of the
Franciscans and a public disputation by Alessandro Achillini (1463—
1512).10 The text that served as the occasion of Nifo's recounting
his conversation with Pico is a passage in al-Ghazzali's Tahafut al
Falasafah, that is, the Incoherence of the Philosophers,
Al-Ghazzali presents as Plato's view—which he himself rejects as
erroneous—that the one and eternal (una et antiqua) soul is divisible
{divίsibilis) according to the division of bodies but returns (redit) to
its source (radix) and is made one (unitur) when it separates itself
from individual human bodies.11 In his commentary, Nifo confesses
that he considered this passage for a long time but always remained
in doubt as to its meaning. He then goes on to relate the explication
of Plato that Pico had offered while they were traveling together
to Bologna. Plato's position is supposedly that there is one Idea of
souls (una idea animarum), which is related to those souls like the
pieces of wood in the arches and vaults of houses. According to Pico,
just as these pieces of wood that are placed beneath (subterposita)
the stones strung together (incalcinatis) in the manner of an arch
leave their "trace" (vestigium) when they are removed after the stones
have dried—this trace is called the "vault" (volta) or "arch" (arcus)—
so too does the single Idea of all souls (una idea numero omnium
animarum) leave its "shadow" (umbra) or "trace" (vestigium), which is
called "soul." This occurs when bodies have been formed by the souΓs
generative power (virtus genitiva) and it withdraws from them. Pico
takes Isaac Israeli's statement that the soul is produced in the shadow
10. For an account and dating of this incident, see Nardi, Saggi, p. 319 and also
pp. 227-228. However, di Napoli (Giovanni Pico, pp. 49-50) has argued that the
incident must have occurred in the academic year 1485-1486; he does not note
that Nifo would have been sixteen years old at the time. It is noteworthy that Nifo
relates that he himself disputed a particular point at Bologna. See Expositio Destructio
destructionum 1 doubt 11, fol. 13vb.
11. Text of al'Ghazzali in Destructiones destructionum 1 doubt 8, fol. 9ra: "Ait
Algazel. Et si forte aliquis diceret quod opinio Platonis est vera, videlicet quod anima
est una et antiqua et dividitur divisione corporum et in corporea separatione redit
ad suam radicem et unitur, nos vero respondemus quod haec opinio est absurdior
opinionibus animae et contra intellectus sententiam." For the English translation
of the Arabic text, see Aυeπoes1 Tahafut aUTahafut, trans. Simon Van Den Bergh
(London: Trustees of the E. J. W. Gibb Memorial, 1969), 1:15.
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(umbra) of the Intelligence to mean that the soul is produced in the
shadow of the one Idea (in umbra ideae) of souls. The soul itself, that
is, the individual human soul, is thus for Plato the "reverberation"
(resultatio) or "trace" (vestigium) of that Idea, just as the Idea itself is
the "nursery" (seminarium) or "root" (radix) of souls. Pico apparently
understood Plato to be referring to this single Idea of souls when
he said that souls return to their nursery (seminarium) at the time
that they abandon their bodies. The explanation is that souls are no
longer "traces" (vestigia) after they flow into their nursery. Nifo sums
up Pico's interpretation of Plato by saying that Plato thus maintained
that all souls are one in their source (radix), although they are also
somehow many in their "beginnings" (originaliter). This interpretation
of Plato's position Nifo considers to be very much in agreement with
what al-Ghazzali and Averroes are saying here. Indeed, Nifo takes al-
Ghazzali's attempt to prove the multiplicity of souls in the lines that
follow to be a sign that Plato thought the soul to be one in number.12
Nifo's own reaction to Pico's interpretation of Plato appears to be
twofold. First of all, he attempts to find some similarity between the
notion of a single Idea of all souls and what Themistius, a "solemn
12. Nifo Expositio Destructio destructionum 1 doubt 8, fol. 9rb: "Ego diu consideravi
verbum istud, et cum inspexi hoc semper steti in dubio et petii declarationem illius.
Dixit comes Mirandulanus corona nostrae aetatis in corbula me petente Bononiam
quod opinio Platonis ponit unam ideam animarum quae se habet respectu animarum
sicut ligna in voltis et arcubus domorum. Dicebat enim quod, sicut ligna ilia sub-
terposita lapidibus incalcinatis ad modum arcus post exsiccationem illorum remota
dimittunt vestigium eorum, quod vocatur volta seu arcus, sic est una idea numero
omnium animarum, quae cum corpora formantur a virtute genitiva egreditur ilia
et recedit dimittitque eius umbram seu vestigium eius, quod anima vocatur. Et sic
dixit dictum Isaac Israelitae intelligi, scilicet quando dicit animam esse productam
in umbra, intelligitur idest ideae. Ista ergo resultatio seu vestigium apud Platonem
anima erat, et ideo ilia ideam seminarium seu radicem dicebat. Et tune dixit Plato
quod quando animae desinunt corpora, tune redeunt ad earum seminarium in tantum
quod vestigia ilia, quae animae erant, amplius non sunt post redundant in suum
seminarium, ut dicit. Et hanc opinionem dixit esse Platonis ilie vir. Et ita Plato
posuit omnes animas esse unam in radice, plures autem originaliter. Et sic huic
multum consonat series verborum Algazelis et Averrois, quoniam nititur Algazel
probare multitudinem animarum in verbis sequentibus, propter quod signum est quod
Plato opinabatur unam esse tantum." This passage is reproduced in Garin's edition
of Pico's De hominis dignitate, pp. 84-85. On Pico's villa at Corbola, see di Napoli,
Giovanni Pico, pp. 227 and 253.
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Platonist" (solemnis Platonicus), supposedly says about Plato according
to Averroes. Paraphrasing a crucial passage from book 12 text 18
of Averroes's long commentary on the Metaphysics, Nifo presents
Themistius as stating that Plato postulated an Idea of the earth (idea
terrae) made from the secondary gods, where Aristotle speaks of the
same as composed of the sun and the inclined orb. Nifo adds that
it is apparent from the passage and also from his own exposition on
that passage that Themistius is talking about an Idea.13 And in his
early commentary on book 12 of the Metaphysics, Nifo does indeed
relate that Themistius proved on behalf of Plato that there had to
be Ideas in order to save the notion that animals are generated from
putrefaction.1^ On Nifo's reading, Themistius argued that since such
animals are not brought into being by parents, and in particular from a
father, they must be produced by their "like" (simile), namely, an Idea.
Nifo then connects this "Idea" with the world-soul (anima mundi)
that Plato puts forth in the Timaeus, though Nifo admits another
interpretation is possible. What is noteworthy is that Nifo considers
Themistius himself to agree with Avicenna and Plato that substantial
forms come from a being separated from matter.15
There are in fact passages in the commentary on the Destructio de*
structionum in which Nifo groups Themistius together with Avicenna
and Plato. In one of these passages, Nifo reviews Plato's conception
of the world-soul in the Timaeus, noting that it is simultaneously the
soul and the mover of the orbs, an Intelligence placed in that soul
by God, and a seed-bearing and vital power infused in matter. He
then finds a similar doctrine in the conception of the agent intellect
put forth by Themistius in his paraphrases on the De anima. Also
supposedly similar is Avicenna's notion of a "giver of forms" (dator
formarum)—called colcodea in Arabic according to Nifo—which is
13. Nifo Expositio Destructio destructionum 1 doubt 8, fol. 9rb: Ήuic etiam Themis*
tius solemnis Platonicus, ut narrat Averroes 12 Metaphysicae, commento 18, concordat
dicens quod Plato posuit ideam terrae factam ex diis secundis; Aristoteles autem a
sole et orbe declini, ubi loquitur de ilia idea, ut apparet ibidem et in expositione mea."
Compare Averroes, Commentaria in libros metaphysicorum Aήstotelis, in Aristotelis Opera
8 (Venice, 1562), 12 text 18, fol. 304rb. Nifo himself would come to view Themistius
as considering the world-soul, not an Idea, to be the source of animation for all souls.
14- Nifo in duodecim metά ta physika seu metaphysices Aristotelis et Averrois text 13
(Venice, 1505), fol. 8va.
15. Nifo In metaph. text 18, fols. llrb-12va.
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the source of substantial forms in things.16 It should be underscored
that the assimilation of Plato, Themistius, and Avicenna was inspired
to some extent by Averroes himself and also by Albert the Great, and
that this assimilation had already been anticipated by Nifo's teacher,
Nicoletto Vernia (d. 1499), who also was an acquaintance of Pico's.17
Nifo promises to take up in his De intellectu Avίcenna's conception of
the dator formarumy or colcodea, and Plato's and Themistius's notion of
a single soul of all forms and souls.18 At this point, Nifo does not seem
to distinguish sharply the position of Themistius from that of Plato.
The second aspect of Nifo's reaction to Pico's interpretation was
to tell Pico that it was not Plato's own doctrine, as was obvious
from the Phaedo. Nifo claims that when he showed Pico the text of
the Phaedoy Pico did not contradict it. However, what Nifo himself
then presents as Plato's thought surely goes beyond the text of that
dialogue. Nifo takes Plato to have held that souls are created by God
in a set number and abide in glory in the heavens or the nursery orb
16. Nifo In metaph. 9 doubt 2, fol. 97va-b. See also 11 doubt 1, fol. 107va. On
Themistius making the agent intellect to be the cause of all sensible forms in book
1 of his abbreviatio of the De anima, see 7 doubt 3, fol. 86rb. This reference appears
to be inspired by Averroes, in metaph. 7 text 31, foi. 18Ira. Nifo does not quote
Ermolao Barbara's translation of Themistius. On the term colcodea, see Carlo A.
Nallino, Raccolta di scritti editi e inediti (Rome: Insitituto per ΓOriente 1948), 6:261;
Bruno Nardi, Studi su Pietro Pomponazzi (Florence: F. Le Monnier, 1965), pp. 234-
235, n. 1; Harry A. Wolfson, Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion, ed.
Isadore Twersky and George H. Williams (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1977), 2:573-576.
17. See Averroes In metaph. 7 text 31, fols. 180vb-181vb; 12 text 18, fols. 393rb-
305rb; and Albert the Great Metaphysica 11.1.8, ed. Bernhard Geyer in Opera Omnia
16/2 (Mϋnster: Aschendorff, 1964), pp. 468b-470a; Nicoletto Vernia, Quaesύo an
dentur universalia realia, in Urbanus Aveπoista phihsophus summus. . . Commentorum
omnium Averrois super librum Aristotelis De physico auditu expositor clarissimus (Venice,
1492), unnumbered folio 3rab. On Averroes's interpretation of Themistius here, see
Charles Touati, "Les problemes de la generation et le role de 1'intellect agent chez
Averroes," in Multiple Averroes, ed. Jean Jolivet (Paris: CNRS, 1978), pp. 157-164.
18. Nifo Expositio Destructio destructionum 9 doubt 2, fols. 97vb and 98ra. Albert
is cited (fol. 98va) on the manner in which forms are contained in matter. On
Vernia's and Nifo's acceptance of Albert's doctrine of inchoaύo formae, see my articles,
"Nicoletto Vernia's Question on Seminal Reasons," Franciscan Studies 38 (1978):
299-309, and "Philosophy and Science in Nicoletto Vernia and Agostino Nifo," in
Scienχa e filosofia all'Universita di Padova nel quattrocento, ed. Antonino Poppi (Padua:
LINT, 1983), pp. 135-202, at pp. 160-163 and 189-190.
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(in signίfero seu orbe seminario). The souls then descend into bodies.
When their descent (descensus) is completed, they are individual in
their respective bodies. Subsequently, there will be the "great year"
(annus magnus), that is, a great circuit, in which all things will return
(redibunt) to the way they had been originally. This circuit or cycle
will take place an infinite number of times and souls will often come
back again (reiterabuntur). Nifo presumes that al-Ghazzali's problems
regarding Plato's doctrine of the soul can be solved with this reading.
The "root" (radix) to which souls return is not a single soul or Idea
of a soul but rather the orb in which they abide and which Plato
calls the "first nursery" (seminarium primum).19 What must be noted
in particular is that the inteφretation that Nifo has set forth here
closely resembles the overall inteφretation to be found in Albert the
Great, an ίnteφretation whose general outlines were also adopted by
Nifo's teacher, Nicoletto Vernia.20
The lines that follow contain further remarks that may provide a
key to Pico's interest in such an inteφretation of Plato and also throw
light on the general intellectual milieu of the period. Nifo relates that
al-Ghazzali rejected the supposed doctrine of Plato that there is only
one soul, since it would then follow that the soul of one human
being is also the soul of another human, whereas in fact the soul of
an individual human, say that of Peter, knows that it differs from
another soul, say that of William. If all the souls of human beings
were one, then their knowledge would also be one or identical, since
19. Nifo Expositio Destructio destructionum 1 doubt 8, fol. 9rb: "Sed licet haec
opinio sit solennis ut vides, dixi sibi quod opinio Platonis non est ista, ut apparet in
Phaedone. Et ei monstravi textum, cui non contradixit. Videbatur enim mihi Platonem
velle animas esse creatas a deo in quodam numero certo et eas stare in signifero
seu orbe seminario in gloria. Et tune ponit quod illae descendunt ad corpora et cum
completur eorum descensus sic quod singula in corpore fuerint, tune erit annus magnus
in quo iterum omnia ut prius redibunt. Et hoc fiet infinities, et reiterabuntur saepe.
Et tune vult ipse per radicem orbem signorum, quern appellat seminarium primum in
quo stant. Et si ista est opinio Platonis, tarn soluta est quaestio Algazelis."
20. See Albert the Great Summa de creaturis 2: De homine 5.2, ed. Borgnet, Opera
Omnia 35 (Paris: Vives, 1896), p. 67; and 5.3, 35:75 and 79-80. Compare Albert Liber
de natura et origine animae 2.7-8, ed. Bernhard Geyer, Opera Omnia 12 (Mϋnster:
Aschendorff, 1955), pp. 30-32. On Vernia's inteφretation of Plato's psychology,
see Mahoney, "Nicoletto Vernia on the Soul and Immortality," in Philosophy and
Humanism: Renaissance Essays in Honor of Paul Oskar Kristeller, ed. Mahoney (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1976), pp. 144-163, at pp. 150-151.
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knowledge is an essential property of the soul. Nifo appears to consider
al-Ghazzali's insistence that knowledge is a substantial property to
rule out the possibility that souls were created in a set number and
presumably would enter, depart, and reenter various human bodies
over the course of time.21 But what is still more interesting is that Nifo
also considers al-Ghazzali's subsequent remarks to touch on Averroes's
doctrine of the unity of the intellect.
Al-Ghazzali himself—that is, the Latin al-Ghazzali as Nifo reads
him—examines the proposal that there is but one soul which is di-
vided according to its "dependence" (dependentia) on different bodies,
but he rejects such a view on the ground that something lacking the
magnitude of measurable quantity cannot be so divided. On the other
hand, Nifo glosses the "dependence" in question as an "ordering"
(ordo) to bodies. He notes, moreover, that the position seems to be
that of the Peripatetics, since Averroes, himself a peripatetic (Averroes
peripatetίcus), thinks that the intellect of all humans is numerically
one in itself, though it can be multiplied extrinsically (extrinsece)
according as it signifies an "ordering" to the different bodies of which
it is the first perfection (perfectio prima). In a word, Nifo has placed
al-Ghazzali's and Pico's supposedly similar readings of Plato's concept
of the soul in the context of interpreting Averroes's doctrine of the
unity of the intellect, a doctrine that Nifo believed at this point in
his career to be the position of Aristotle himself.22 Indeed, Nifo even
states that al-Ghazzali's arguments in the text under consideration
preclude that one intellect (unus intellectus) could be many.23
21. Nifo Exposiύo Destrnctio destructionum 1 doubt 8, fol. 9rb. Nifo will return to
this passage in his De intellectu.
22. On the shift in Nifo's evaluation of Averroes as an accurate interpreter of
Aristotle, see Mahoney, "Agostino Nifo's Early View on Immortality," journal of the
History of Phibsophy 8 (1970): 387-409.
23. Text of al-Ghazzali in Destructiones destructionum 1 doubt 8, fol. 9ra, and
Nifo, Exposiύo Destructio destructionum 1 doubt 8, fol. 9rb: "Έt si forte aliquis ar-
guat, dicens quod sint unum animae,' id est, quod omnes animae sint unum, 'sed
dividuntur secundum dependentiam,' id est ordinem ad corpus, sicut videtur opinio
peripateticorum, vult enim Averroes peripateticus, ut dixi, quod intellectus omnium
est unus numero in specie, potest tamen multiplicari extrinsice prout est dicens
ordinem ad diversa corpora quorum est perfectio prima. Contra hoc arguit Algazel
dicens: 'Nos dicimus quod dividi id quod magnitudinem quantitatis mensurabilium
non habet est falsum.' Ergo supra impossibile est unicum intellectum esse multos
respectu corporum." For the English translation of al-Ghazzali, see Averroes' Tahafut
aUTahafut, ed. Van Den Bergh 1:15.
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In his own rejoinder to these remarks of al-Ghazzali, Averroes takes
up the possibility that Peter differs from William numerically but is
one with him in form, namely, in their soul. In this case, if the soul
does not cease at the cessation of the body, then, when it is separated
from the body, it will of necessity be one in number. Although
this might seem at first glance to be a concession to al-Ghazzali's
interpretation of Plato, it is not. Averroes considers al-Ghazzali's
argumentation against Plato to be sophistical. First of all, there is
an equivocation at work regarding the terms "same" and "different,"
since they can have different meanings. The soul of William and the
soul of Peter can be called "one" as regards their form and yet "many"
as regards their substrata (ratione subίectorum)—that is, the different
underlying "subjects" in which they exist, namely, human bodies. Fur-
thermore, al-Ghazzali errs in saying that what lacks quantity cannot be
divided, for it can be divided at least accidentally through its substrata.
Indeed, Averroes insists that it is precisely in this way that form and
soul are divisible, that is, by the division of their substrata (divisione
subίectorum). He adds that the soul thus closely resembles light insofar
as light is divided by the division of illuminating lights, whereas it
again becomes one on the removal of these other illuminating lights.
It is the same with the soul and bodies.24
In his commentary on this text, Nifo draws on his own under-
standing of Averroes's doctrine of the unity of the intellect. He
explains that the "form of the human being" (forma hominis)—which
is in fact the lowest of the Intelligences25—can be considered in two
different ways, namely, as it is "soul" and as it is "intellect," that is,
24. Averroes Destructiones destructionum 1 doubt 8, fol. 9va. In his translation
from the Arabic text, Van Den Bergh reads "illuminated" and not "illuminating."
See Averroes Tahafut aLTahafut, ed. Van Den Bergh 1:16.11. This passage influenced
Moses Narboni (c. 1300-1366) in a commentary that he wrote on one of Averroes's
treatises on conjunction. Indeed, he appears to have fashioned a Plato "quotation"
from Averroes's remarks. Moreover, he connects what he attributes to Plato with
Averroes's doctrine of the unity of the intellect. See The Epistle on the Possibility of
Conjunction with the Active Intellect by Ibn Rushd with the Commentary of Moses Narboni,
ed. and trans. Kalman P. Bland, Moreshet Series, Studies in Jewish History, Literature,
and Thought 7 (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America/KTAV, 1982),
Introduction, p. 22. Bland (p. 113, n. 4) recognizes Averroes as Narboni's source and
correctly excludes any genuine source in Plato or Plotinus.
25. On the lowest Intelligence as the forma hominis, see Nifo Expositio Destructio
destructionum 1 doubt 8, fol. 9rb; 1 doubt 23, fol. 23rb; and 6 doubt 2, fol. 74vb.
176 EDWARD P. MAHONEY
a separate substance. Going beyond the text—but in fact borrowing
from Averroes's Physics and perhaps also from Walter Burley's com-
mentary on that work26—Nifo argues that just as a column is "left"
or "right" not of itself but from its "ordering" to different human
beings (ex ordine ad diversos homines) standing near it in such fashion
that there is no newness (novitas) or modification in the column,
so too is the intellect "many souls" without any real multiplication
occurring in it, for all multiplication comes about on the part of
human bodies. Accordingly, the intellect can be called "many" per
accidens and extrinsically—that is, without any modification in its
very substance—just as the column is called "right" only per accidens
by reason of the thing that is "right" simpliciter, that is, the objects
near the column. The intellect can be considered "many" per accidens
and extrinsically (extrinsece), that is, many "souls", as it regards (prout
respicit) the bodies of different human beings.27
Nifo thus considers Averroes to have reduced Plato to his own
position insofar as he takes Plato to hold that the soul is in some way
one and in some way many, since it is one simply and absolutely in
its substance and yet many by its relationships to different substrata.
26. See Averroes In phys. 7 text 20; Aήstotelis Opera 4, fol. 322va; and Walter
Burley Expositio in libros octo De physico auditu 7 text 20, ed. Nicoletto Vernia (Venice,
1482), sig. KlvaΛϋra.
27. Nifo Expositio destrnctio destructionum 1 doubt 8, fol. 9rb: "Debes scire quod
forma hominis potest dupliciter considerari, videlicet inquantum anima et inquantum
intellectus, substantia existens separata. Si prίmo modo, dico quod sicut columna est
dextra et sinistra non per se sed ex ordine ad diversos homines sic quod nulla est
novitas in ea sic intellectus prout respicit homines diversos est anima multa, non
multiplicatione accidenta ei sed multiplicatione se tenente ex parte corporum. Et sic
potest dici multus per accidens extrinsece sicut columna dicitur dextra per accidens
ratione rei dextrae simpliciter. Si autem consideratur ut intellectus est, sic est unus
per se et per accidens, quoniam ut sic separatur ab omni respectu ad quodcumque
extrinsecum. Et sic anima est una quodammodo et plures quodammodo, una quidem
per se et simpliciter, multae autem extrinsece et per accidens." A like interpretation of
Averroes is given by Nicoletto Vernia, Nifo's teacher, in his Contra perversam Averrois
opinionem de unitate intellectus et de animae felicitate quaestiones divinae (Venice 1505),
fol. 6vb. This interpretation was vehemently attacked by the Franciscan theologian
at Padua, Antonio Trombetta. See Mahoney, "Antonio Trombetta and Agostino Nifo
on Averroes and Intelligible Species: A Philosophical Dispute at the University of
Padua," in Storia e cultura al Santo, ed. Antonino Poppi (Vicenza: N. Pozza, 1976),
pp. 289-301.
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Nifo himself attempts to aid Averroes's reading of Plato by suggesting
that when Plato says man is nothing but his soul, insofar as he uses
the body as its instrument, what is meant is that the soul remains one
simply and absolutely like an individual artisan and yet becomes many
in the way that the single artisan becomes many by using different in-
struments. Oddly enough, despite his having earlier challenged Pico's
interpretation by citing the Phaedo and his having presented as Plato's
position that God created a fixed number of individual souls, Nifo now
states that the notion of a single soul for all does seem to be Plato's
own opinion as he himself has written in his own De inteΐlectu.^
This seeming discrepancy in Nifo's interpretation of Plato may be
explained in various ways. Nifo may have offered the Phaedo passage
and maintained that Plato held to a plurality of souls before he had
read much Plato. Or again he might have simply been engaging in a
dialectical joust with Pico and was not committing himself absolutely
to the view that for Plato there was a fixed number of individual souls
that had been created by God. In any case, throughout his career Nifo
would continue to worry the question whether the soul was one or
many for Plato.29
Although Pico is mentioned again in Nifo's early commentary on
the De anima, which was published in 1503, he is now cited not for
his interpretation of Plato's psychology but for his views on whether
we can believe a proposition to be true or false as we please.30 In this
28. Nifo Expositio Destructio destructionum 1 doubt 8, fol 9rb: "Circa dicta primo
debes scire quod opinίonem Platonis Averroes reduxit ad opinionem eius intantum
quod Plato ut Averroes innuit nihil aliud nisi sit quodammodo una et quodammodo
plures. Est enim una simpliciter et absolute in substantia et plures respective et in
habitudine ad diversa subiecta, ut dixi iam. Et hanc opinionem Averroes ascribit
Platoni. Et addo quod Plato videtur dicere quod homo non est aliud nisi anima prout
utitur corpore tanquam ίnstrumento. Et ideo sicut navis est nauta tantum utens
instrumento, sic homo est anima utens corpore tanquam instrumento et sicut artifex
est quodammodo unus simpliciter et absolute, sic et anima. Et haec videtur opinio
Platonis, ut scripsi in libro De intellectu"
29. For a more detailed discussion, see Mahoney, "Plato and Aristotle in the
Thought of Agostino Nifo (ca. 1470-1538)," in Platonismo ed aήstotelismo nel mez-
zogiomo d'ltaha (secc. XίV-XVί), Biblioteca delΓOfficina di Studi Medievali 1, ed.
Giuseppe Roccaro (Palermo: Officina di Studi Medievali, 1989), pp. 79-102.
30. Agostino Nifo Collectanea ac commentaria in libros De anima (Venice, 1522) 2
coll. 153, fol. 146rb-va. I cite this edition for the sake of convenience. For the first
edition, see Augustini Niphi super tres libros De anima (Venice, 1503).
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commentary, Nifo considers Averroes to be so true an interpreter of
Aristotle that he calls him the "Arab Aristotle" {arabs Aristoteles).31
Aristotle and Averroes are agreed on the doctrine of the unity of
the intellect.32 On the other hand, Nifo shows strong interest in
the possibility of conciliating Plato and Aristotle, and he explicitly
mentions Ammonius, Themistius, and Simplicius along these lines.33
Nifo makes constant use both of Ermolao's translation of Themistius's
paraphrases on the De anima and also of a now-lost translation of
the De anima that has traditionally been attributed to Simplicius,
and he prefers on occasion their explanations of the text to those
of the Latins, namely, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and Giles
of Rome.3^
Nifo reveals remarkable sensitivity to the Platonic orientation of
the De anima attributed to Simplicius, listing Simplicius among other
platonicί like Plotinus and Origen and stating at one point that Sim-
plicίus's exposition seems to be more in accord with Plato than with
Aristotle.35 Indeed he attempts to assimilate Themistius, Simplicius,
and the Plotinus who emerges from Ficino's commentary on the
Enneads, in a manner that bears on our topic of Pico's interpretation
of Plato. Basing himself on Ermolao's translation of Themistius's
paraphrases on the De anima, Nifo attributes to Themistius a theory of
a rational soul which extends into each individual living body an "an-
imation" (animatio) or "life" {vita), adding however that Themistius
leaves in doubt whether this first soul, that is, the rational soul,
31. Nifo Collectanea 2 coll. 97, fol. 122vb.
32. Nifo Collectanea 1 coll. 12, fol. 20rb-21va; compare 3 coll. 1, fol. 2ra-b; 3
coll. 5, fol. llrb-va.
33. Nifo Collectanea 1 coll. 36, fol. 65va. For Nifo's "conciliation" of Plato
and Aristotle on divine knowledge and on whether unity is above being and the
other transcendentals, see 2 coll. 5, fol. 16rb-va. Garin thinks that on the latter
question Nifo has rejected Pico for Ficino. See Eugenio Garin, La cultura filosofica del
Rinascimento italiano (Florence: Sansoni, 1961), p. 117.
34. In Collectanea 3 coll. 5 (fol. 16vb), Nifo also cites Simplicίus's De coelo and
Physics. In the commentary on the Destructio, Nifo cited both these works but not
the De anima that is attributed to Simplicius. His use of this latter work in his own
early commentary on the De anima has been noted by Nardi, Sαggi, pp. 377-382.
The Greek Commentators would come to have an ever greater importance in Nifo's
philosophical works.
35. Nifo Collectanea 3 coll. 23-24, fob. 47va and 48rb.
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is one or many—in the later De intellectu he will take Themistius
to hold it to be one. What is significant for our purposes here is
that Nifo takes Themistius to attribute this same theory to Plato
and Aristotle, and he himself goes on to see it present in Plotinus's
Enneads I . 3 6 This explication of Themistius is clearly inspired by re-
marks of Marsilio Ficino who, in his own commentary on the Enneads,
takes the rational soul, the "first soul," to pour forth into the body a
"life" (vita), which is properly called an "animation" (animatio) and
"vivification" (viυificatio), whereas the rational soul alone is properly
called "soul." Ficino appears to believe that Themistius adopted from
Plato and Plotinus a conception of a single intellect informing the
many rational souls which he then attributed to Aristotle.37 More-
over, Nifo uses almost the same passages from Ficino to explicate
the psychology that emerges from the commentary on the De anima
attributed to Simplicius.38 He even cites Themistίus's supposed notion
of "animation" when explicating how one intellect provides the soul
36. Nifo Collectanea 2 coll. 37, fols. 93vb-94ra. For the source in Themistius, see
Themistius in libros Aristotelίs De anima paraphrasis, ed. R. Heinze, Commentaria in
Aristotelem Graeca 5/2 (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1899), pp. 25-27. Compare Themistius
Libri paraphraseos. . .in libros De anima 1.23, in Libri paraphraseos Themistii in Posteriora
Aristotelis, in Physica, in libros De anima. . .interprete Hermolao Barbaro (Treviso,
1481), sig. bb2r-bb2v. See Plotinus Enneads 1.1.7, 1.1.10, and 1.1.12.
37. Marsilio Ficino, argumenta to Enneads 1.1.1 and 1.1.7, in Opera Omnia (Basel,
1576), pp. 1548-1549 and 1551-1552. For a presentation of the relevant passages
in Themistius's paraphrases on the De anima and their impact on earlier medieval
philosophers, see Mahoney, "Themistius and the Agent Intellect in James of Viterbo
and Other Thirteenth-Century Philosophers (Saint Thomas, Siger of Brabant, and
Henry Bate)," Augustiniana 23 (1973): 422-467, especially pp. 424-431. See also
Mahoney, "Neoplatonism, the Greek Commentators, and Renaissance Aristotelian-
ism," in Neoplatonism and Christian Thought, ed. Dominic ]. O'Meara (Albany: SUNY
Press, 1982), pp. 169-177 and 264-282, especially pp. 171-172 and 264-266. There
are detailed surveys of the scholarly literature in the notes of these two studies.
38. Nifo in De anima 3 coll. 1, fol. lrb. Compare Nardi, Saggi, pp. 378-379, who
identifies some of the passages that Nifo quotes from Simplicius, but who does not
notice Nifo's clear dependence on Ficino. For a more general discussion, see Mahoney,
"Marsilio Ficino's Influence on Nicoletto Vernia, Agostino Nifo, and Marcantonio
Zimara," in Marsilio Ficino e il ritorno di Platone: Studi e documenti, ed. Gian Carlo
Garfagnini (Florence: Olschki, 1986), 2:509-531, at pp. 517-524. Eckhard Kessler
does not bring out Ficino's influence on Aristotelians of the Renaissance in his
study, "The Intellective Soul," in The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, ed.
Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, and Eckhard Kessler (Cambridge: Cambridge
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for many individual human beings.39 Whether or not Nifo has inter-
preted Themistius and Simplicius in a wholly accurate fashion, he has
correctly seen that the problem of the one and the many was central
for them and related to a like worry in Plotinus.40
The De intellectu is of course Nifo's major early work touching on
questions of philosophical psychology. It is also one of the works in
which he shows strong interest in delineating the similarities as well
as the differences among various philosophers of antiquity and the me-
dieval period. He appears to be the first Aristotelian commentator of
the Renaissance to compare in detail the platonici, especially Plotinus,
both with Themistius and Simplicius and also with Averroes. This
interest in Simplicius and Themistius he shared with his own teacher,
Nicoletto Vernia, as well as with Pico himself.41 But it must be added
University Press, 1988), pp. 484-534. Some of his remarks on Vernia, Nifo, and
Pomponazzi are imprecise.
39. Nifo De anima 3 coll. 20, fol. 44rb. Nifo's reading of Simplicius is not wholly
accurate here.
40. It should be noted that in De anima 3 coll. 5 (fol. lOva), Nifo does seem to
believe that the intellect is one in number for Themistius. For further discussion on
Nifo's relating Plotinus to the two Greek Commentators, see Mahoney, "Neop la ton-
ism, the Greek Commentators, and Renaissance Aristotelianism," pp. 171-173 and
272-274. What gives Nifo's approach to Simplicius an unusual twist is that he takes
Simplicius to have held that the single intellect together with the individual "life" in
each human being forms the "whole soul" (tota anima) or the "whole rational soul"
(tota anima rationalis), that is, a certain essential unity (quoddam unum essendale). Nifo
has thus applied to Simplicius a terminology that he took from an interpretation of
Averroes found in Siger of Brabant's now lost De intellectu. Although Nifo accepted
Siger's explication of Averroes as correct when he wrote his early commentary on
the De anima, he would abandon it soon thereafter in the De intellectu and attack
Pico for having adopted it. On Siger's theory, see Bruno Nardi, Sigieri di Brabante
nel pensiero del Rinascimento italiano (Rome: Edizione Italiane, 1944); and Mahoney,
"Saint Thomas and Siger of Brabant Revisited," Review of Metaphysics 27 (1974):
531-553; and Mahoney, "Sense, Intellect, and Imagination in Albert, Thomas, and
Siger," in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretzmann,
Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982),
pp. 602-622.
41. On Pico's interest in Simplicius and Themistius, see Nardi, Sαggί, pp. 373—
375; Garin, Storia deϊla filosofia italiana, pp. 460-462; and Kristeller, "Giovanni Pico
della Mirandola and His Sources," pp. 54-55 and 62. There are conclusiones for
Themistius and Simplicius in Pico's Conclusiones, ed. B. Kieszkowski, pp. 39-41. In
an earlier study, Kieszkowski had argued that Pico's entire knowledge of Themistius
and Alexander was based on questions and commentaries prepared for him by Elia del
Medigo. Supposedly only after Pico had composed the Conclusiones did he study the
PICO, PLATO, AND ALBERT THE GREAT 181
that the remarks made about the platonici and even about Plato are at
times inspired by statements to be found in the writings of Albert the
Great.42 We might thus characterize Nifo as under the joint influence
of Renaissance Platonism (through the works, the translations, and
the commentaries of Ficino) and of medieval Platonism (through the
writings of Albert). As we shall see, Pico, too, borrows from a work
of Albert in his approach to Plato's psychology.43
On occasion in the De intellectu, Nifo appears to attribute to Plato
himself belief in personal immortality.44 And while platonici like Plot-
inus and Iamblichus are presented, on the one hand, as holding that in
Greek Commentators directly. See Bohdan Kieszkowski, "Les rapports entre Elie del
Medigo et Pic de la Mirandole (d'apres le ms. lat. 6508 de la Bibliotheque Nationale),"
Rinascimento 4 (1964): 41-91, at p. 53. The author's remarks on Pico, Themistius,
and Simplicius are questionable. For recent valuable discussions on Elia, see Herbert
Davidson, "Medieval Jewish Philosophy in the Sixteenth Century," in Jewish Thought
in the Sixteenth Century, ed. B. D. Cooperman (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1983), pp. 106-145, at pp. 110-111; and Alfred L. Ivry, "Remnants of Jewish
Averroism in the Renaissance," in the same volume, pp. 243-265, at pp. 250-261.
Of special relevance here is Kalman P. Bland's important new study, "Elijah del
Medigo's Averroist Response to the Kabbalahs of Fifteenth-Century Jewry and Pico
della Mirandola," Journal of Jewish Thought and Phifosophy 1 (1991): 23-53.
42. The mixture is strikingly apparent in Nifo Liber de intellectu 1.1.8 (Venice,
1503), fol. 5va, where he presents "Platonic arguments" (demonstrationes platonicae)
from Plotinus that are borrowed to the word from Ficino's argumentum to Enneads
4 7.epilogue, in Opera Omnia, 1754- His "other argument of Plato" {alia Platonis ratio)
and the argument cited from the Phaedrus (De intellectu 1.1.8, fol. 6rab) are taken
from Albert De natura et oπgine animae 2.1 (12:18-19), and 2.6 (12:26-27). For
discussion, see my "Agostino Nifo's Early Views," pp. 451 and 456-457.
43. On Nifo's "Albertism," see my "Albert the Great and the Studio Patavino"
pp. 551-554. Because he does combine what he learns about Plato's teachings both
from reading Plato himself in Ficino's newly available translations and also from
reading what Albert and Ficino attribute to Plato and the platonici, Nifo would come
to express in his later writings his own puzzlement as to Plato's position. It is no
surprise then that in his De immortalitate animae and his second, Pisan commentary
on the De anima he should take up Eusebius's charge that Plato was inconsistent
in his remarks about the soul. For details and discussion, see Mahoney, "Plato and
Aristotle in the Thought of Agostino Nifo," pp. 91-96. For a major contribution
to our knowledge of Plato's impact on the Renaissance, see James Hankins, Plato in
the Italian Renaissance, Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition 17 (Leiden: E. J.
Brill, 1990).
44. Nifo De intellectu 1.1.9, fol. 6va. See Opera Platonis, trans. Marsilio Ficino
(Venice, 1491), fol. 262vb, for the Timaeus passage; fol. 180rb-va, for the Phaedo
passage.
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the preexistent state there are many distinct rational souls, Theophras-
tus, Themistius, and Averroes are presented, on the other hand, as
holding that the rational soul is a single Intelligence.45 When Nifo
does turn to Themistius and Theophrastus in particular, he explains
that they hold that there is one soul for all living things, called the
world-soul (mundi anima), that sends forth an "animation" (animatio),
"life" {vita), or "soul" (anima) into all living things, just as the sun
sends forth illuminations into all bright things. This same world-soul
is also called "the intellect of the human being" (intellectus hominis)
insofar as it sends forth the power of thinking to the soul. What is
important for our purposes is that Nifo quotes passages from Ficino's
translation of Timaeus 34B and 41C which appear to show that Plato,
too, held to a world-soul that universally vivifies all living things by
extending to them an animation (animatio) or life (vita) and that is
like a seed (semen) and principle (principium) containing within its
own power (continens in sua virtute) all the forms and all the activities
of all the forms. He adds that Themistius himself takes Aristotle to
be speaking of such an animation or "second soul" (anima secunda)—
and not the soul which is one for all—when he calls the soul the
first act. According to Nifo's reading of Themistius, there is, then, no
conflict between Plato and Aristotle on the distinction between the
one single rational soul and the individual "animation" (animatio) or
"second soul" (anima secunda) that is found in the individual living
thing.46 On several occasions in the De intellectu, Nifo returns to this
theory of the world-soul that he has attributed to Themistius and that
45. Nifo De intellectu 1.1.17, fols. 9vb-10ra.
46. Nifo De intellectu 1.1.17, fol. lOrb-va. Nifo is closely following here Ermolao's
translation. See Themistius Libri paraphraseos . . . in libros De anima. . . interprete Her-
molao Barbaro 1.23, sig. bb2r-v, cited above in note 32. Nifo returns to Themistius's
interpretation of Plato as upholding a single soul and also individual souls in 1.2.18,
fol. 24rb, where he quotes from Ermolao's translation about Plato in Libri paraphraseos
. . An libros De anima 3.38, sig. ff4r-v. Compare Themistius In libros Aristotelis De
anima paraphrasis, ed. R. Heinze, p. 107, lines 23-29. Nifo challenges Themistius's
conciliation of Plato, Aristotle, and Theophrastus. See Nifo De intellectu 1.5.21,
fol. 52rb-va. In doing so, he may also intend to criticize Vernia. On the latter's
conciliation of Plato and Aristotle, see Mahoney, "Nicoletto Vernia on the Soul and
Immortality," pp. 153, 155, and 158-162; "Neoplatonism, the Greek Commentators,
and Renaissance Aristotelianism," pp. 170-171 and 268-269; and "Philosophy and
Science in Nicoletto Vernia and Agostino Nifo," pp. 167-168 and 171-172.
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he had already discussed in his earlier commentaries on the Destructio
destructίonum and the De animal
In one discussion regarding Themistius and the platonici, Nifo be-
gins by noting that "outstanding men of Plato's sect" (praestantissimi
viri ex Platonίs secta) hold that the rational souls {rationales animae)
flow from the world-soul (anima mundi) and that these souls give
human beings their existence and put them in their species. Some
of the followers of Plato say that the rational souls are parts of the
world-soul, a position that Plato sometimes appears to maintain. Nifo
cites the Philebus, Phaedrus, Timaeus, and the Republic to justify this
statement about Plato. However, he is careful to distinguish Plato
from those who identify the world-soul with God, noting that Plato
would perhaps say, as is obvious from the Timaeus, that God and the
world-soul differ and that the world-soul is located in the middle of
the world.48
Nifo then turns from the platonici to later philosophers (posteriores
philosophantes), such as Themistius, Theophrastus, al-Ghazzali, and
Avicenna, who thought that all the souls of living things flowed
from the world-soul just as illuminations (illuminationes) flow from the
sun. They do not hold that the numerically one rational soul, called
"the world-soul" (animamundi), directly animates within living things
(intus viva) but that it provides all living things with individual souls
that are also called rational souls. Nifo explains how it is necessary
according to Themistius to postulate two such rational souls (duae
rationales animae). The one rational soul is individual, inseparable
from the body, and destructible at the death of the body. This is the
47. Nifo De intellectu 1.1.24, fol. 13rb. Nifo again cites what he takes to be
Themistius's account of the phenomenon oί spontaneous generation. See Themistius
Libri paraphraseos. . .in libros De anima 1.23, sig. bb2r-v. Compare Themistius, in
libros Aristotelis De anima paraphrasis (Heinze 25—26). For other relevant passages in
Nifo De intellectu, see 1.1.7 (fol. 19ral), 1.1.18 (24rb), 1.3.9 (31ra), 1.3.20 (33rr>-
34ra), 1.4.14 (41va), 1.5.10 (48va-b), 1.5.11 (49ra), 1.5.13 (49vb), and 1.5.22 (52vb).
For the colcodea language, see 1.4-9 (40ra) and 1.4-11 (40va), as well as Nifo De
demonibus 2.15, in De intellectu, fol. 80rb. On Nifo's adoption of this terminology for
Avicenna's dator formarum, see Harry A. Wolfson, Studies in the History of Philosophy
and Religion, 2:574-576.
48. Nifo De intellectu 1.1.24, fol. 13ra-b. The citations presented in behalf of the
view that God is the world-soul are borrowed from Albert the Great De homine 5.2
(Borgnet 35:68a and 71a).
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soul that Themistius calls "the rational soul" and that Aristotle says
he is defining in book 2 of the De anima. The other rational soul is
separate and one in number for all living things and all animals. This
is the soul that Themistius calls both "the intellect of the human
being" (inteϊίectus hominis), since it provides the power of thinking,
and also "the world-soul" (mundi anima). Avicenna, on the other
hand, calls it the "giver of forms" (dator formarum), while Averroes
calls it an Intelligence (intelligentia). However, Nifo appears puzzled
as to the precise nature of the individual rational soul or "animation"
for Themistius and seems to suggest several lines later that it was
a "creation" for the ancient commentator. Nifo contrasts those who
speak of "animations" (animationes)y "lives" (vitae), or "second lives"
(animae secundae) coming forth from the world-soul—presumably the
"outstanding men of Plato's sect" mentioned earlier—with Themistius
and others of his sect (alii suae sectae) who say that the animation
comes from the world-soul as a creation (creatio)^9
To make clearer the nature of the animations that flow from the
world-soul according to these platonici, Nifo turns to the very same
comparison that Pico had used to represent his own account of how
there was for Plato one Idea of souls and yet many souls. Nifo first
explains that for these platonici the animation comes forth from the
world-soul neither by "creation" (creatio), as with Themistius and his
followers, nor by the division of the world-soul, but rather through
an "impression" (impressio) left by the world-soul from its entering
{ingressus) into the body. He then offers an example of such a process
that he says is given by John Saracene (Joannes Saracenus), and he
expressly points out that this example or comparison is narrated by
Albert the Great. Just as in vaults and arches of walls (in testudinibus
ac parietum arcubus) a wooden arch is first set up on which the vault is
completed, and after that arch has been removed there remains both
its "trace" (vestigium) in the vault and also the separate arch (separatus
arcus) itself, so too the world-soul (anima mundi) animates living
substances by means of a "trace" (vestigium) in that living substance.50
49. Nifo De intellectu 1.1.24, fol 13rb-va. Nίfo's interpretation of Themistius on
"animation" owes much to Averroes. For the latter's presentation of Themistius on
generation, see Touati, "Les problemes de la generation."
50. Nifo De intellectu 1.1.24, fol. 13vb: "Post hos adhuc animationes ac vitas,
quae animae secundae nuncupantur, dicunt ab anima mundi provenire, non quidem
per creationem ut Themistius et alii suae sectae, nee per divisionem animae mundi,
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In a word, Nifo appears to have discovered in Albert the source of the
analogy that Pico had related to him during their journey together to
Ferrara some years earlier.
It should be carefully noted that Nifo has somewhat bent the
passage from Albert to his own purposes. Although the passage does
concern Plato's remarks in Timaeus 41 A-D, the supposed quote
from John Saracene that is found in Albert refers not to the world'
soul (anima mundi) but rather to "Idea-Forms" (formae ideales) which
inform sensible substances.51 In the same chapter, Albert himself
appears to take Plato to be saying that all forms are induced in matter
by a giver of forms (dator formarum) that is an Idea (idea) separated
from matter. The form induced in matter is called an "image" (imago),
since it imitates the forming form that is outside matter. Albert points
out that some people have called such an image a "reverberation"
(resultatio), while others have called it a "shadow" (umbra) inasmuch
as it darkens on entering matter.52 And elsewhere in his Metaphysics
Albert refers to such an image as a "life" (vίtα).53 It would thus appear
that Pico borrowed not only the comparison of the arch from Albert
but also his interpretation of Plato according to which there is a single
Idea which leaves its "reverberation" (resultatio) or "trace" (vestψum)
in individual human beings. Indeed, the interpretation of Plato that
Pico offers seems closer, as we shall now see, to that of Albert than
does that of Nifo.
Whatever be the accuracy of Nifo's presentation of this passage
from Albert regarding Plato, it is striking that Nifo himself makes
sed per impressionem reltctam ex ingressu eius in corpus. Cuius exemplum Joannes
Sarracenus dedit Alberto narrente dicens quod quemadmodum in testudinibus ac
parietum arcubus primo Hgneus supponitur arcus super quem testudo concludίtur et
postea remoto arcu remanet vestigium in testudine ac separatus arcus remanet, ita est
in mundi anima animante substantias vivas, quae non nisi per vestigium est in viva
substantia. Et hoc iuramentum erat deorum, quod Appollo reddit sacramento."
51. See Albert Metaphysica 11.1.8 (16:469.13-24).
52. Albert Metaphysica 11.1.8 (16:468.68-85 and 470.31-32/68-76). Albert him-
self rejects this view of Plato that forms are not educed from (edudtur), but are
rather induced (inducitur) in, the potency of matter (16:471.5-7). See also Albert
Metaphysica 1.4.9 (16:60.33-36). It has been suggested that Albert here has borrowed
his interpretation of Plato from Boethius. See Georg Wieland, Untersuchungen zwn
Seinsbegήff im Metaphysikkommentar Alberts des Grossen, BGPTM N S 7 (Munster:
Aschendorff, 1972), p. 73, n. 33.
53. Albert Metaphysica 1.1.2 (16:4-20).
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heavy use of Albert to claim that the position he has ascribed to
Plato was maintained by various platonici^ A few chapters later, when
presenting the "true position" on the origin of the soul, which is
borrowed word for word from Albert's De natura et origine animae, Nifo
himself turns to Timaeus 41 CD. While Albert had used this passage
just after ascribing to Plato the view that there are Ideal Forms in
the divine mind, Nifo reads it to mean that Plato understood by the
seed (semen) a light from which all things flow and which Plato took
to be the soul situated in the middle of things, vivifying them all.
Nifo adds that if Plato did think this then his view can be reduced to
what Nifo is defending—and borrowing from Albert—namely, that
God produced all things from God's own light.55 However, it should
not be thought that Nifo eliminates the notion of Divine Ideas or
exemplars from his own presentation of Plato. When he takes up the
question whether there can be more than one world, he suggests that
Plato allowed this possibility insofar as he says in the Timaeus that
the sensible world is made in accord with the exemplar (exemplar)
of the intelligible world (mundus intelligίblis), that is, the Idea of the
world (idea mundi). And just as there can be many houses of the
same nature and yet only one Idea of a house, so there could be many
worlds (plures mundi) from God's one sole Idea (una dei sola idea).^
When Nifo returns yet again to contrast Themistius and Theo-
phrastus to the platonίci, he draws both on Albert's De natura et
origine animae and also on Ficino's commentary on his translation
of the Enneads of Plotinus. What is both striking and of special
importance here is that Nifo now uses a comparison very similar to
that of the wooden arch and the impression it leaves in the resulting
stone arch when it is removed. The comparison that he offers is of
the impression left in wax when a ring that has been pressed against
it is removed. This comparison, too, is drawn from one of Albert's
discussions regarding Plato. Following Albert closely, Nifo points out
54. Nifo De intellectu 1.1.24, fol. 13va. See Albert De homine 5.3 (Borgnet 35:79b),
27.3 (152ab), 21.1 (176a), 61.2 (523b). For Isaac, see also Albert De anima 2.1.8,
ed. C. Stroick, Opera Omnia 7 (Mϋnster: Aschendorff, 1968), p. 76ab.
55. Nifo De intellectu 1.1.28, fols. 15vb-16ra. See Albert Metaphyska 1.5.12
(16:64), and 1.5.15 (16:89). Albert combines the notions of the Divine Ideas, "seed,"
and light in his own discussion of Plato.
56. Nifo De intellectu 1.3.5, fol. 30ra. Pico and Henry of Ghent are mentioned
later in the chapter.
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that Plato distinguished two kinds of form. The first kind is that of
forms ante rem, that is, an exemplar and model (exemplar et paradigma)
existing universally, immaterially, and simply in the intellect moving
in nature, that is, God. These forms are called "first forms" (formae
primae) because they have the power of forming things.57 The second
kind of form is that which the platonici call "images" (imagines) of the
first sort of form. They are as it were like the "imprint" in wax from a
ring (sigillum ab annulo in cera), since the forms in matter, as Plato says,
come from separate intelligible forms (separata intelligibilia formalia)
as if from a certain "imprint" (ethermagrum)β^ Oddly enough, Nifo
now borrows this comparison from Albert in order to explicate the
doctrine of the world-soul that he had ascribed to Themistius, despite
the fact that he had earlier contrasted Themistius with the platonici—
Themistius supposedly held that the animation was "created" by the
world-soul, whereas the platonici held that it was an "impression"
from the world-soul. Needless to say, the present-day reader may
justifiably question whether the same sort of comparison can helpfully
illuminate different conceptions of the vivifying process. It is possible,
of course, that Nifo's dependence on this comparison reveals his own
puzzlement as to what Themistius actually meant by the "creation" of
an animation—if we concede to Nifo his interpretation of Themistius.
Nifo recounts that according to Plato the mind of the First Intellect
is the form ante rem containing in itself all possible images (imagines);
this form can be likened to the figure of a ring which contains all
living things. The similarity between Plato and Themistius that Nifo
goes on to delineate is that the many "souls" that Themistius sees
flowing from the one world- soul and which different people variously
call "lives" (vitae), "animations" (animationes), "reverberations" (re-
sultationes), "images" (imagines), "traces" (vestigia), and "impressions"
(ίmpressίones) are comparable to the figures or shapes left in wax by a
ring. Nifo discerns a resemblance between the view of the soul that
he attributes to Themistius and Theophrastus and the view of such
57. See also Albert Metaphysica 1.4.9 (16:60).
58. Nifo De intellectu 1.2.7, fols. 18vb-19ra. See Albert De natura et origine animae
1.2 (12:4-5), and Ficino, argumentum to Enneads 1.1.7-8 (pp. 1551-1552). The
comparison to a figure or image impressed in wax also appears in Albert's Metaphysica
at 1.4.13 (16:66.73-75), and at 11.1.8 (16:471.3-4), and in his De intellectu et
intelliφili 1.2.5 (Borgnet Opera Omnia 9 [Paris: Vives, 1890], p. 496). The term
ekmageion occurs in the Timaeus 50C.
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platonici as Porphry, Iamblicus and Plotinus. None of them thinks
that the one and single soul directly animates living things; their
position is rather that its animating power (virtus animativa) extends
a "life" into the living thing. InNifo's judgment, Themistius and these
platonici thus stand opposed to Aristotle's conception of the soul.59
By this point it should be abundantly clear that Pico's account of
Plato's theory of the soul as narrated by Nifo was indebted to Albert
the Great, especially to the passage in his Metaphysics containing the
comparison from "John Saracene." Oddly enough, this connection
between Pico and Albert has not been noted by scholars interested in
Pico. What has been detected by Bruno Nardi and others is a supposed
connection between Pico and both Simplicius and Siger of Brabant:
it is Nifo himself who provides the most significant clues relating Pico
to these two philosophers. A detailed examination of Nifo and Pico,
on the one hand, and Simplicius and Siger, on the other, would take
us beyond the bounds of the present study, but surely enough should
be set forth to bring out the connection of Pico's views on Siger to
his views on Plato that we have just now examined.
Nifo sets forth as the true interpretation of Simplicius's account of
the unity and the multiplicity of rational souls that from the single
intellect that is one for all humans, on the one hand, and the sensitive
or cogitative souls, on the other hand, there results a certain whole
(quoddam totum), namely, the "rational soul," which is individual with
each human being and numbered according to the number of existing
bodies. This rather distorted reading of Simplicius enables Nifo to
claim that for that commentator the intellect is one and yet the
59. Nifo De intellectu 1.2.8, fol. 19rb. On the other hand, Nifo pits the platonici
and Themistius against one another in 1.3.12-13, fol. 31rb-vb, on the grounds
that the former, especially Plotinus, hold there to be a plurality of intellects that
are immortal by reason of a plurality of rational souls or "first lives" which extend
"second lives" into individual human bodies. Basing himself on texts from Averroes
and from Ermolao's translation of Themistius, he takes Themistius to have been
unable to explain how there could be rational souls which were both separate from
matter and also numerically many. See especially Themistius Libri paraphraseos . . .in
libros De anima 3.32-33, sig. ff2v-fϊ3r, and in De anima paraphrasis (Heinze 103.20-
104.23). Themistius is identified with Averroes and Theophrastus as holding an
erroneous position {error purus) on the unity of the intellect in De intellectu 1.3.30,
fol. 37va. At 1.5.21 (52rb-va), Nifo also rejects Themistius's attempt to reconcile
Plato and Aristotle.
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multiplicity of rational souls, each of which gives existence to an
individual human, can be saved. Adding that many believe this to be
the mind of Plato himself, Nifo quotes from al-Ghazzali's statement
in the Destructio that the opinion of Plato is that the one and eternal
(una et antiqua) soul is divided according to the division of bodies but
returns {redit) to its source (radix) when it is separated from the body.
He then quotes Averroes's comment on this text from al-Ghazzali,
namely, that the soul of Peter and the soul of William can in some
way be said to be one and the same (una et eadem) on the part of the
form but in another way be many by reason of their substrata (ratione
subiectorum). He also quotes Averroes's later remark in the Destructio
that all the wise commonly think that the newness (innovatio) of the
soul is wholly relative, since it results from its ability to be joined to
different bodies, as well as Averroes's remark in his long commentary
on the Metaphysics that for Aristotle the form of humans as they are
humans results from their union (continuaύo) with the intellect. Nifo
then notes that some take from these passages that Averroes, like Sim-
plicius, holds the intellect to be one for all human beings though it is
multiplied and numbered in human beings as their individual "rational
soul" (rationalis anima).60 Since these passages that Nifo has quoted
from al-Ghazzali's Destructio and Averroes's own Destructio are the
very ones that occasioned his discussion of Pico in his commentary on
those works, it seems safe to infer that Pico himself presented the rec-
onciliation of Simplicius and Averroes that Nifo has presented here.
Nonetheless, it is instructive to note that in the very next chapter of
the De intellect^ Nifo presents texts and arguments from Averroes to
show the falsity of such an interpretation of the latter's psychology.61
Pursuing his ideal of exhaustive coverage of all possible positions,
Nifo next sets out Siger of Brabant's attempt to mediate between
Averroes and medieval Latins so as to assert the unity of the intellect
with Averroes and yet assert that the intellect constitutes each human
being in his or her individual existence as this individual human
60. Nifo De intellectu 1.3.16, fol. 32ra-b. See the text of al-Ghazzali in Destructiones
destructionum for 1 doubt 8 (fol. 9ra), quoted above in note 11. See also Averroes
Destructiones destructionum 1 doubt 8 (fol. 9va) and doubt 23 (23ra), as well as
Averroes In metaph. 12 text 38, fol. 321rb.
61. Nifo De intellectu 1.3.17, fol. 32rb-va. Nifo would later reverse his position in
the Pisan commentary on the De anima.
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being.62 Nifo now reveals that Giovanni Pico {Joannes Picus), in
order to show that he could sustain any position howsoever false,
attempted in discussion with Nifo to justify this position as being
in accord with Aristotle, Averroes, Themistius, and all the ancient
commentators on Aristotle—presumably SimpUcius would be one of
the latter. Evidently Nifo and Pico had engaged in debate regarding
Siger's thesis, for while marshaling some twenty-seven passages and
arguments culled from Averroes himself against that thesis, Nifo notes
Pico's attempts to blunt the force of two of these passages.63
Having demonstrated that Siger's position does not square with the
mind of Averroes himself, Nifo now sets out to show that the others
whom Pico had claimed could be reconciled with Siger's view actually
held opposed positions. Turning to Themistius, he cites passages from
Ermolao's translation of the paraphrases on the De anima in order
to show that for the ancient commentator the "whole rational soul"
(tota rationalis anima) is composed only of the agent intellect and the
potential intellect.64 Furthermore, Averroes sees the single rational
soul united to individual humans operationally through the cogitative
power whereas Themistius sees the one rational soul united to humans
by the animation that it extends to each individual human being.65
Nifo also denies that Themistius and Simplicius agree on the nature
of the soul and intellect.66
Nonetheless, Nifo does go on to suggest that Averroes, Themistius,
and all philosophers—Plato included—take as a self-evident proposi-
tion that there can be a multiplicity of individuals within the same
species only through the division of matter. Basing himself on remarks
62. Nifo De intellectu 1.3.18, fols. 32vb-33ra. Nifo relates Siger's position as found
in the latter's now lost De intellectu, which was written in reply to Aquinas's De unitate
intellectus contra Aveπoistas. For discussion, see Nardi, Sigieή dί Brabante, pp. 11-38;
Mahoney, "Saint Thomas and Siger of Brabant Revisited," pp. 537-540; Mahoney,
"Sense, Intellect, and Imagination in Albert, Thomas, and Siger," pp. 613-616;
Femand Van Steenberghen, Maΐtre Siger de Brabant, PM 21 (Louvain: Publications
universitaires, 1977), pp. 360-363. See note 41, above.
63. Nifo De intellectu 1.3.19, fol. 33ra-vb. Garin reproduces key excerpts from
this chapter in his edition of Pico, De hominis dignitate, pp. 85-86. See the first and
seventeenth arguments of Nifo for Pico's counterinterpretations.
64. Nifo De intellectu 1.3.20, fol. 34ra.
65. Nifo De intellectu 1.3.23, fol. 34va. See also 1.3.20, fols. 33vb-34ra.
66. Nifo De intellectu 1.3.22, fol. 34rb.
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of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, Nifo argues that Plato did not
hold a multiplicity of Ideas that were similar in species, since the
very cause of their being individuals, namely, matter, was lacking.67
Nifo thus appears to see a parallel between Averroes's postulating
only one intellect for all human beings (since it is separated from
matter and therefore from whatever would cause it to be multiple)
and* Plato's postulating an Idea of the human being that is by essence
{per essentiam) numerically one (because he holds that by its very
essence that Idea is separated from individuals and exists without
matter). Nifo again appeals to Siger's De intellectu for an account
of how the intellect can be one for Averroes and yet be the form
of the many human beings who actually exist. Noteworthy for the
development of the "Albert connection" is that Nifo here presents
Siger as a serious man who belonged to the Averroist sect during the
time of the "Expositor," that is, Thomas Aquinas, and who was a
disciple of Albert the Great (Suggerius υίr gravis, sectae Averroίstίcae
fautor aetate expositors, discipulus Alberti).68
What surely merits attention is that in this same chapter Nifo has
seen a parallel between Averroes's one intellect for all human beings
and Plato's single Idea for all human beings, based on their acceptance
of matter as the principle of individuation, and has again recounted
from Siger's De intellectu a way to reconcile Averroes's doctrine of the
unity of the intellect with the plurality of humans—a solution that
Nifo had told us Pico himself had adopted. But even more significant
67. Nifo De intellectu 1.3.24, fol. 34vb. See Themistius Libri paraphraseos. . .in
libros De anima 3.32, sig. fϊ2v; compare his In De anima paraphrasis (Heinze 103.26-
30). The relevant passage in Aristotle is Metaphysics 1.6.987bl4—18. Nifo quotes
from Thomas Aquinas Super Metaphysicam 1.10, ed. M. R. Cathala and R. M. Spiazzi
(Turin: Marietti, 1971), no. 157. He follows Thomas's use of the concept of matter
as the principle of individuation in order to analyze Plato's theory of ideas. See
Thomas Super Metaphysicam 1.10, nos. 154-155, but also 1.14, no. 209. On the
problem of individuation in medieval philosophy, see Johannes Assenmacher, Die
Geschichte der Individuationspήnzips in der Scholastik (Leipzig: F. Meiner, 1926); Jorge J.
E. Gracia, Introduction to the Problem of Individuation in the Early Middle Ages (Munich:
Philosophia, 1984); and Joseph Owens, "Thomas Aquinas: Dimensive Quantity as
Individuating Principle," Mediaeval Studies 50 (1988): 279-310.
68. Nifo De intellectu 1.3.26, fol. 35va-b. On the problem of the connection
between Siger and Albert, see Albert Zimmermann, "Albertus Magnus und der
lateinische Averroismus," in Albertus Magnus: Doctor Universalis 1280/1980, ed. G.
Meyer and A. Zimmermann (Mainz: Matthias Grunewald, 1980), pp. 465-493.
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is that when Nifo attempts to explain how in fact the intellect is
one for Averroes and yet can be called many souls, he refers the
reader to the very passages in the Destructio that were the occasion
for his narrating Pico's account of how Plato could maintain there
is only one soul.69 Plato, Averroes, Siger, and the comparison that
Pico borrowed from Albert thus continued to be interconnected for
Nifo at the time that he finished and published his De intellectu. He
clearly took very seriously Pico's explication of Plato and also Siger's
interpretation of Averroes in order to reconcile various philosophers.
Nonetheless, Nifo rejected both that explication of Plato and also
Siger's interpretation of Averroes.
Obviously Pico's own understanding of Siger merits more
detailed attention for the light that it will throw both on Pico's
own thought and on Nifo's own interpretation of Siger and Averroes.
Much remains to be done to establish in a more definitive manner
the impact of medieval philosophy on what we call "Renaissance
Aristotelianism."70
Duke University
69. Nifo De intellectu 1.3.26, fol. 35va-b. See Nifo Expositio Destructio destructionum
1 doubt 8, fol. 9rb, and 1 doubt 23, fol. 23rb. Nifo also refers here back to his earlier
discussion of Averroes in De intellectu 1.1.14, fol. 21va-b, where he also cites his
Expositio Destructio destructionum 1 doubts 23-24.
70. After the completion of this study, the recent monograph by Fernand Roulier,
Jean Pic de laMirandole (1463-1494), humaniste, philosophe, et thέobgien, Bibliotheque
Franco Simone 17 (Geneva: Slatkine, 1989), came to my attention. Roulier does
allude to Pico's stay at Padua and his connection to Vernia and Nifo. He also refers
to Pico's conversation with Nifo regarding Plato (see especially p. 369, n. 69; pp. 407
and 409). Unfortunately, he seems unaware of changes in Vemia's and Nifo's positions
and ignores most recent scholarship in English dealing with Padua, Vernia, and Nifo.
I should like to note that different versions of this paper were read to the University
Seminar on the Renaissance, Columbia University, on 6 March 1984, and to a
meeting of the Society for Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy at San Diego on
28 March 1992. It is my intention to return to Nifo on Pico, Siger, and Simplicius
on another occasion. I must express once again my gratitude to the Duke University
Research Council for grants for travel and microfilming that made this study possible.
